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Abstract—The progress in the last decade has enabled machine learning models to achieve impressive performance across a wide
range of tasks in Computer Vision. However, a plethora of works have demonstrated the susceptibility of these models to adversarial
samples. Adversarial training procedure has been proposed to defend against such adversarial attacks. Adversarial training methods
augment mini-batches with adversarial samples, and typically single-step (non-iterative) methods are used for generating these
adversarial samples. However, models trained using single-step adversarial training converge to degenerative minima where the model
merely appears to be robust. The pseudo robustness of these models is due to the gradient masking effect. Although multi-step
adversarial training helps to learn robust models, they are hard to scale due to the use of iterative methods for generating adversarial
samples. To address these issues, we propose three different types of regularizers that help to learn robust models using single-step
adversarial training methods. The proposed regularizers mitigate the effect of gradient masking by harnessing on properties that
differentiate a robust model from that of a pseudo robust model. Performance of models trained using the proposed regularizers is on
par with models trained using computationally expensive multi-step adversarial training methods.
Index Terms—Adversarial robustness, adversarial training, stability of neural networks.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP Neural Networks (DNNs) achieve impressive per-formance on various tasks in Computer Vision. How-
ever, the susceptibility of these networks to adversarial sam-
ples [1] (samples with crafted noise that can manipulate the
model’s output) is an important issue. Further, Szegedy et
al. [1] showed that these adversarial samples are transferable
across models of the same or different architectures, and
this property enables an attacker to launch attacks on the
deployed models in a black-box setting ([2], [3], [4]): where
partial or no knowledge of the deployed model is available
to the attacker. These properties of adversarial samples pose
challenges for the deployment of DNNs in the real world.
A plethora of works have proposed various methods to
defend against adversarial attacks, such as input transfor-
mations ([5], [6]), adversarial training ([7], [8], [9], [10]), de-
tection ([11], [12]), etc. In this direction, adversarial training
method shows promising results, where mini-batches are
augmented with adversarial samples, and typically these
samples are generated by the model being trained. Further,
adversarial samples can be generated by non-iterative ([7],
[8]) or iterative methods ([9], [13]). In order to scale adver-
sarial training to large datasets, non-iterative methods such
as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7] are used. How-
ever, models trained using single-step adversarial training
methods (adversarial samples are generated using non-
iterative methods) are susceptible to iterative attacks in a
white-box setting [8] (complete knowledge of the deployed
model is available to the attacker), and to non-iterative and
iterative attacks in a black-box setting ([4], [10]).
Tramer et al. [10] demonstrated that models trained
using a single-step adversarial training method converge to
degenerative minima, and this causes gradient masking i.e.,
the linear approximation of loss becomes unreliable for gen-
erating adversarial samples using a non-iterative method.
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Non-iterative methods such as FGSM generate adversarial
perturbations based on the first-order approximation of the
loss function i.e., perturbation is in the direction of the
sign of the gradient of the loss with respect to the input
image. Further, it is implicitly assumed that the model’s
loss increases for a large perturbation in this direction. This
assumption is valid for normally trained models and is
not valid for models trained using single-step adversarial
training. Madry et al. [9] showed that it is possible to learn
robust models, by including adversarial perturbations that
maximize the loss while training, and further show that
the maximization of loss can be achieved by generating
adversarial samples using iterative methods. Unlike non-
iterative methods, iterative methods perturb image slightly
at each step and this prevents models from exhibiting gradi-
ent masking. Though iterative methods help to learn robust
models, they are computationally expensive and cause train-
ing time to increase drastically. In this work, we propose
three different types of regularizers that help to learn ro-
bust models using single-step adversarial training methods.
The proposed regularizers harness the salient properties of
models trained using iterative methods, such as loss surface
smoothness and loss monotonicity, and incorporate these
properties into models trained using single-step methods.
Following are the major contributions of this work:
• We bring out the salient properties that differentiate a
robust model from that of a pseudo robust model such
as loss monotonicity.
• Harnessing on the above properties, we propose three
different types of regularizers to learn robust models
using single-step adversarial methods. The resultant
models are robust against both non-iterative and itera-
tive attacks, and achieve on par results when compared
to models trained using computationally expensive
multi-step adversarial training methods.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 introduces
the notation followed in this paper, section 3 discusses the
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2related works, section 4 presents the proposed approach,
section 5 hosts the experiments, and section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 NOTATIONS
In this section we define the notations followed throughout
this paper:
• x : clean image from the dataset.
• ytrue : ground truth label corresponding to the image x.
• f(·) : neural network that maps input image x to the class
probabilities.
• g(·) : pre-softmax output of the neural network.
• θ : parameters of the neural network.
• J : loss function e.g., cross-entropy loss.
• ∇xJ : gradient of the loss with respect to the input image
x
• m : mini-batch size.
•  : perturbation size of the crafted noise.
• xfgsm : potential adversarial sample corresponding to the
image x, generated using FGSM [7].
• xifgsm : potential adversarial sample corresponding to
the image x, generated using IFGSM [14].
• xrfgsm : potential adversarial sample corresponding to
the image x, generated using RFGSM [10].
3 RELATED WORKS
Following the findings of Szegedy et al. [1], various image
specific (e.g. [4], [7], [14], [15]) and image agnostic (e.g. [16],
[17]) attacks have been proposed. Various defense methods
([6], [7], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26])
have been proposed to defend against adversarial attacks.
In this direction, adversarial training approach [7] shows
promising results. Kurakin et al. [8] observed that models
trained using single-step adversarial training methods were
susceptible to multi-step adversarial attacks in a white-box
setting. Further, Tramer et al. [10] demonstrated that the
pseudo robustness of these models is due to the gradient
masking. Gradient masking causes the first-order approxi-
mation of the loss function to become unreliable for gener-
ating adversarial samples using non-iterative methods, and
this results in the exclusion of useful adversarial samples
during training.
Madry et al. [9] demonstrated that it is possible to learn
models that are robust to single-step and multi-step attacks,
if perturbations crafted while training maximize the loss.
An iterative method named Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) is used to generate such adversarial samples. Fur-
ther, Zhang et al. [27] proposed a regularizer for multi-
step adversarial training to encourage the output of the
classifier to be smooth. Other line of works such as [28],
[29] provide defense certification for norm-bound attacks.
However such methods are hard to scale for large datasets
and attack perturbation sizes. Whereas in this work, we
propose three different types of regularizes to learn robust
models using single-step adversarial training methods. The
proposed regularizers help to mitigate the effect of gradient
masking during single-step adversarial training.
3.1 Adversarial Sample Generation Methods
In this subsection we explain methods for generating
adversarial samples.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7]: Generates
adversarial samples based on the first order approximation
of the loss function, via performing simple gradient ascent.
x∗ = x+ .sign
(∇xJ(f(x; θ), ytrue)) (1)
Random + Fast Gradient Sign Method (RFGSM) [10]:
This method adds small random noise before generating an
adversarial sample using the FGSM method.
x′ = x+ α.sign
(N (0d, Id)) (2)
x∗ = x′ + (− α).sign(∇x′J(f(x′; θ), ytrue)) (3)
Where, N represents normal distribution
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (IFGSM) [14]:
In this method, FGSM is applied in an iterative fashion
with a small step size (α). In our experiments we use
α = /steps.
x0 = x (4)
xN+1 = xN + α.sign
(∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)) (5)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [9]: Here the perturba-
tion is initialized with a random point within the allowed
l∞ norm ball and then IFGSM is applied with re-projection.
x0 = x+ U(− step, step, shape(x)) (6)
xN+1 = xN + step.sign
(∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)) (7)
xN+1 = clip
(
xN+1,min = x− ,max = x+ ) (8)
Where, U represents uniform distribution.
Projected Gradient Descent with CW loss (PGD-CW):
Variant of PGD attack which uses C&W [15] loss instead of
cross-entropy loss.
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-
FGSM) [4]: Introduces momentum into the IFGSM
formulation. Here, µ represents the momentum term and α
is set to /steps.
x0 = x, p0 = 0 (9)
pN+1 = µ.pN +
∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)
||∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)||1
(10)
xN+1 = xN + α.sign
(
pN+1
)
(11)
DeepFool: An iterative method proposed by [13]. The
method generates an adversarial perturbation based on the
linear approximation of the model, that would cause the
sample to cross the decision boundary.
Carlini and Wagner (C&W): An iterative method proposed
by [15], aims at generating perturbation with a minimum
l2 norm that is sufficient to fool the model i.e., the
optimization objective is to find an adversarial perturbation
with a minimum l2 norm.
33.2 Adversarial training
FGSM Adversarial Training (FGSM-AT) [8]: During FGSM
adversarial training, a portion (typically 50%) of clean sam-
ples in the mini-batch are replaced with their corresponding
FGSM adversarial samples. This method is fast and simple,
but the resultant models are not robust to multi-step attacks.
Ensemble Adversarial Training (EAT) [10]: During training,
FGSM adversarial samples are generated by the model
being trained or by one of the models from a fixed set of
normally trained models, chosen at random. Models trained
using this method show improvement against adversarial
attacks in a black-box setting. Further, models are still sus-
ceptible to multi-step attacks in a white-box setting.
PGD Adversarial Training (PGD-AT) [9]: During training,
all the clean samples in the mini-batch are replaced with
their corresponding PGD adversarial samples.
TRADES [27]: During training, an augmented mini-batches
containing clean samples and their corresponding adver-
sarial samples are created. These adversarial samples are
generated using PGD method with a surrogate loss instead
of cross-entropy loss. Models trained using TRADES and
PGD-AT are robust against both single-step and multi-step
attacks. However, training time is significantly large when
compared to single-step adversarial training methods i.e.,
FGSM-AT and EAT.
3.3 Loss surface
In this work, we obtained the plot of loss surface [10] around
the data points to illustrate the effect of gradient masking.
Loss surface is obtained by varying the input to the model
using Eq.(12).
x∗ = x+ 1.δ1 + 2.δ2 (12)
Where, δ1 is the sign of the gradient of loss with respect to
the input sample, and δ2 is the sign of the random noise
sampled from Normal distribution (N ). 1 and 2 represent
the perturbation size. Loss surface is a 3D plot, where x and
y axes represent the perturbation size, and z-axis represents
the loss.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we explain the criteria for learning robust
models using the adversarial training method [9]. We show
that this criterion is not satisfied during the single-step ad-
versarial training. Further, we explain the salient properties
that differentiate a robust model from that of a pseudo
robust model. Harnessing on these properties, we propose
three different types of regularizes that help to learn robust
models using single-step adversarial training methods.
4.1 Criteria for learning robust models
Madry et al. [9] demonstrated that it is possible to learn
robust models using the adversarial training method, if
perturbations crafted while training maximize the loss. This
objective can be formulated as a mini-max optimization
problem (Eq. 13).
min
θ
[
E(x,y)∈D
[
max
δ∈S
J
(
f(x+ δ; θ), ytrue
)]]
(13)
Where, D is the training dataset, and S is the feasible set
S = {δ : ||δ||∞ ≤ }. At each iteration, we need to find
an adversarial perturbation (||δ||∞ ≤ ) that maximizes the
model’s loss, and further we need to update the model’s
parameters (θ) so as to minimize the loss on adversarial sam-
ples. Madry et al. [9] solves the inner maximization problem
by generating adversarial samples using the Projected Gra-
dient Descent method (iterative method). Single-step adver-
sarial training is a special case of mini-max optimization
problem (Eq. 13), where the inner maximization is assumed
to be achieved by adversarial samples generated by single-
step methods. Iterative methods such as PGD, ensure that
the generated perturbations will increase the model’s loss,
since at each step of the generation process, perturbation
with small  is added to the image. The increase in the loss
is not guaranteed when perturbation with high  is added
to the image in a single step. In the next subsection, we
show that during the initial stages of single-step adversarial
training, the extent of loss maximization achieved by the
adversarial samples generated using single-step and multi-
step methods are similar. Further, we show that in the later
stages of training, single-step adversaries are not able to
maximize the loss due to gradient masking effect.
4.2 Gradient masking effect
In this subsection, we empirically show that the extent of
maximization of loss achieved by FGSM adversaries dur-
ing the initial stages of single-step adversarial training, is
similar to that achieved by PGD (iterative method) adver-
saries. Further, we show that as training progress, the ability
of FGSM samples to maximize the loss diminishes. We
train WideResNet-28-10 on CIFAR-10 dataset using FGSM
adversarial training method. We obtain the plot of cross-
entropy loss versus perturbation size () of FGSM and
PGD attacks, during the initial (at iteration 40 (×100)) and
final stages (at iteration 600 (×100)) of training. Bottom-
left and bottom-right plots of Fig. 1 shows the obtained
plots. It can be observed that during the initial stage of
training, the difference between the average loss on FGSM
and PGD adversaries is small (see bottom-left plot of Fig. 1
for =8). This implies that the extent of loss maximization
achieved by FGSM samples is similar to that achieved by
PGD samples. Whereas during the later stage of training,
the difference between the average loss on FGSM and
PGD adversaries is large (see bottom-right plot of Fig. 1
for =8) i.e., the generated FGSM samples are not able to
maximize the training loss. This large difference is due to the
gradient masking. During single-step adversarial training,
when the model starts to mask the gradient, its decision
surface exhibits a sharp curvature near the data points [10].
This sharp curvature obfuscates the adversarial direction.
Single-step adversarial sample generation methods such as
FGSM generate adversarial samples based on the linear
approximation of the loss function, and gradient masking
causes the linear approximation to become unreliable for
generating adversarial samples. To illustrate the gradient
masking effect, we obtain the loss surface plots. Fig. 3 shows
the loss surface plots obtained during the initial and final
stages of FGSM adversarial training. From the left plot of
Fig. 3, it can be observed that there is no sharp curvature
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Fig. 1. Top: Plot of average l2 distance between (i) pre-softmax output
of FGSM and IFGSM adversaries, and (ii) pre-softmax output of FGSM
and RFGSM adversaries of clean samples, obtained for the model
trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using FGSM adversarial training method.
Observe the increases in the l2 distance after ∼80 iteration (×100).
Bottom: Plot of the average loss of the model versus perturbation size
of PGD and FGSM attacks. Bottom-left: Plot obtained at iteration 40
(×100), Bottom-right: Plot obtained at iteration 600 (×100). Observe the
gradient masking effect in the bottom-right plot i.e., difference between
the average loss on PGD and FGSM samples is large for =8/255.
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Fig. 2. Top: Plot of average l2 distance between (i) pre-softmax output of
FGSM and IFGSM adversaries, and (ii) pre-softmax output of FGSM and
RFGSM adversaries of clean samples, obtained for the model trained on
CIFAR-10 dataset using PGD adversarial training method. Observe that
for the entire training duration, average l2 distance is relatively small.
Bottom: Plot of the average loss of the model versus perturbation size
of PGD and FGSM attacks. Bottom-left: Plot obtained at iteration 40
(×100). Bottom-right: Plot obtained at iteration 600 (×100).
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Fig. 3. Loss surface plot of the model trained using FGSM adversarial
training method. Left: loss surface obtained during the initial stage of
training. Right: loss surface obtained during the final stage of training.
Please refer to section 3.3 for details on loss surface plot.
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Fig. 4. Loss surface plot of the model trained using PGD adversarial
training method. Left: loss surface obtained during the initial stage of
training. Right: loss surface obtained during the final stage of training.
Please refer to section 3.3 for details on loss surface plot.
in the loss surface plot of the model obtained during the
initial stage of training. Whereas, a sharp curvature can
be observed in the loss surface plot of the model obtained
during the later stage of training, and this curvature artifact
obfuscates the adversarial direction.
Unlike FGSM adversarial training, during PGD adver-
sarial training, the difference in the average loss on the
FGSM and PGD samples is small during the initial and final
stages of training (see bottom-left and bottom-right plot of
Fig. 2). Further, from Fig. 4 it can be observed that there
is no sharp curvature in the loss surface plots obtained
during the initial and final stages of training. Note that,
iterative methods such as PGD generate adversarial samples
by adding a small perturbation to the image at every step,
and this ensures that the added perturbation will increase
the loss.
4.3 Salient properties of robust models
In this subsection, we bring out the salient properties that
differentiate a robust model from that of a pseudo robust
model. We train WideResNet-28-10 on CIFAR-10 dataset
using FGSM-AT and PGD-AT methods. During training,
we obtain the average Euclidean distance between (i) pre-
softmax output of FGSM and IFGSM adversaries, and (ii)
pre-softmax output of FGSM and RFGSM adversaries. After
training, we obtain the plot of the average cross-entropy
loss versus perturbation size of FGSM attack. Following are
the salient properties observed in robust models:
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Fig. 5. Plot of loss versus perturbation size of FGSM attack, obtained for
the model trained using single-step and multi-step adversarial training
methods. Left: FGSM adversarially trained model. Right: PGD adver-
sarially trained model. Observe that, for PGD adversarially trained model
loss increases monotonically with the increase in perturbation size.
(i) Loss increases monotonically with the increase in
perturbation size: Column-2 of Fig. 5 shows the plot of
the average cross-entropy loss versus perturbation size
of FGSM attack obtained for the model trained using the
PGD-AT method. It can be observed that the average loss
increases monotonically with the increase in perturbation
size. From column-1 of Fig. 5 it can be observed that for
the model trained using the FGSM-AT method, the average
loss does not increase monotonically with the increase in
perturbation size.
(ii) Similar pre-softmax output for adversarial samples
generated using different methods: The top plot of
Fig. 2 shows the average Euclidean distance between
pre-softmax output of adversarial samples generated using
different methods, obtained during PGD-AT. It can be
observed that for the entire training duration, the average
Euclidean distance is relatively small. Whereas during
FGSM-AT, these distances are initially small and become
relatively large after a few iterations (Fig. 1, top). Note that,
during the initial stage of FGSM-AT, the average Euclidean
distance between pre-softmax output of (i) FGSM and
IFGSM samples, and (ii) FGSM and RFGSM samples, are
small. Further, these Euclidean distances start to increase
when the model starts to mask the gradients (Fig. 1, top).
4.4 Proposed single-step adversarial training with reg-
ularization term
In the previous subsection, we have shown the salient prop-
erties that differentiate a robust model from a pseudo robust
model. Harnessing on these observations, we propose three
different types of regularizers which help to learn robust
models using single-step adversarial training methods. The
proposed regularizers penalize the model for masking gra-
dients, and this enables the inclusion of useful single-step
adversarial samples during the entire training process.
4.4.1 Single-step Adversarial Training with Regularizer-1
(SAT-R1)
In subsection 4.3, we observed that during single-step ad-
versarial training, the average Euclidean distance between
the pre-softmax output of FGSM and IFGSM adversaries in-
crease drastically. Whereas during PGD-AT, this distance is
relatively small and does not increase as training proceeds.
Based on these observations, we include a penalty term in
the training loss (Eq. 14) to minimize the distance between
pre-softmax output of FGSM and IFGSM adversaries of
clean samples during single-step adversarial training.
Loss = 1
m
m∑
i=1
J(f(xifgsm; θ), y
i
true)
+ λ
1
k
k∑
j=1
∥∥g(xjfgsm)− g(xjifgsm)∥∥22
(14)
In Eq. (14), the first term corresponds to the classification
task, and the second term represents the proposed regular-
ization. Further, λ represents the regularization weighting
factor and k represents the number of adversaries gener-
ated using IFGSM. During training, when the model starts
to mask the gradients, the proposed penalty term causes
training loss to increase (since the distance between pre-
softmax output of FGSM and IFGSM adversarial pair in-
creases). This behavior of the proposed penalty term helps
in mitigating the effect of gradient masking, and thus en-
ables the generation of stronger adversaries while training.
In section 5 we show that k=1 (i.e., penalty is imposed on
one FGSM and IFGSM adversarial pair of a clean sample
in the mini-batch) is sufficient to learn robust models. This
means that only one adversarial sample in the mini-batch
is generated using an iterative method and the remain-
ing adversarial samples are generated using non-iterative
method. Further, we show that adversarial training with
mini-batches containing one IFGSM and m FGSM samples
without the proposed regularizer, does not improve the
model’s robustness significantly. The result of this ablation
experiment is shown in section 5.
4.4.2 Single-step Adversarial Training with Regularizer-2
(SAT-R2)
In section 4.3, we showed that when the model starts to
mask gradients, then the Euclidean distance between pre-
softmax output of FGSM and RFGSM adversaries of a
clean sample becomes large. Based on this observation, we
introduce a regularization term in the training loss (Eq.15)
that penalizes the effect of gradient masking during single-
step adversarial training.
Loss = 1
m
m∑
i=1
J(f(xifgsm; θ), y
i
true)
+ λ
1
m
m∑
j=1
∥∥g(xjfgsm)− g(xjrfgsm)∥∥22
(15)
In Eq.(15), the first term corresponds to the classification
loss, and the second term represents the proposed regular-
ization. During training, if the model starts to mask gradi-
ents, then the Euclidean distance between pre-softmax out-
put of FGSM and RFGSM adversaries of clean samples
increases, and this in turn causes the training loss (Eq. 15) to
increase. This behavior of the proposed regularizer prevents
the model from masking gradients. Note that, adversarial
training with RFGSM or with both RFGSM and FGSM sam-
ples does not improve the model’s robustness significantly.
The results of these experiments are shown in section 5.
6TABLE 1
Architecture of networks used for Ensemble Adversarial Training (EAT) on MNIST dataset.
LeNet+ A B C D
Conv(32,5,5) + Relu Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128,3,3) + Tanh { FC(300) +Relu }× 4MaxPool(2,2) Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Conv(64,8,8) + Relu MaxPool(2,2) Dropout(0.5)
Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Dropout(0.25) Conv(128,6,6) + Relu Conv(64,3,3) + Tanh FC + Softmax
MaxPool(2,2) FC(128) + Relu Conv(128,5,5) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
FC(1024) + Relu Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) FC(128) + Relu
FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax
TABLE 2
Setup used for Ensemble Adversarial Training (EAT). Please refer to
table 1 for details on models used for MNSIT dataset.
Network to be trained Pre-trained Models
LeNet+ (ens-A) LeNet+, A
MNIST LeNet+ (ens-B) LeNet+, B
LeNet+ (ens-C) A, B
WRN-28-10 (ens-A) WRN-28-10, ResNet-34
CIFAR-10 WRN-28-10 (ens-B) WRN-28-10, VGG-19
WRN-28-10 (ens-C) ResNet-34, VGG-19
ResNet-18 (ens-A) ResNet-18, ResNet-34
ImageNet Subset ResNet-18 (ens-B) ResNet-18, VGG-11
ResNet-18 (ens-C) ResNet-34, VGG-11
4.4.3 Single-step Adversarial Training with Regularizer-3
(SAT-R3)
In subsection 4.3, we demonstrated that for a robust model,
loss on the FGSM adversarial samples increases mono-
tonically with the increase in perturbation size, and this
behavior is not observed in the model trained using the
single-step adversarial training method. Based on this ob-
servation, we propose a regularisation term which enforces
the model’s loss to increase monotonically with the increase
in perturbation size. Eq. (16) represents the training loss.
Loss = lossHigh + λ.max
(
0, lossLow − τ.lossHigh
)
(16)
Where, lossLow and lossHigh represent the average loss
on FGSM adversarial samples with perturbation size of
Low and High respectively. The first term corresponds
to the classification task, and the second term represents
the monotonic loss constraint. During training, we ensure
lossLow < lossHigh by enforcing (lossLow/lossHigh) < τ ,
where τ < 1. For stability purpose, we consider (lossLow −
τ.lossHigh) < 0. During training, if the model starts to
mask gradients, the second term in Eq. (16) becomes greater
than zero, and this causes training loss to increase. This
behavior of the proposed loss constraint, explicitly prevents
the model from generating weaker adversaries during ad-
versarial training. Also, note that the monotonicity of loss
is enforced for the allowed perturbation range [0, High]
i.e., the maximum value of High is restricted based on
perceptual constraints.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we show the performance of models
trained using the proposed training methods against
adversarial attacks in white-box and black-box settings.
We perform sanity tests described in [30], [31] to ensure
that models trained using the proposed regularizers
are robust, and do not exhibit obfuscated gradients.
Since, models exhibiting gradient masking or obfuscated
gradients are not robust against adversarial attacks [30].
Code for the proposed approach is available at
https://github.com/val-iisc/SAT-Rx.
Dataset: We show results on MNIST [32], CIFAR-10 [33] and
ImageNet-subset (100 classes) [34] datasets. For ImageNet-
subset, we randomly choose 100 classes. We use LeNet+
(refer to table 1), WideResNet-28-10 (WRN-28-10) [35] and
ResNet-18 [36] for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset
datasets respectively. Images are pre-processed to be in [0,1]
range. For data-augmentation, horizontal flip and random
crop are performed for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset
datasets.
Training methods: We compare the proposed training
methods with Normal training (NT), FGSM Adversarial
Training (FGSM-AT) [8], Ensemble Adversarial Training
(EAT) [10], PGD Adversarial Training (PGD-AT) [9], and
TRADES [27]. Refer table 2 for details on the experimental
setup used for EAT.
Attacks: We show the performance of models trained using
different training methods against l∞ and l2 attacks. For
l∞ norm-bounded attacks, we use FGSM [7], IFGSM [14],
MI-FGSM [4], PGD [9] and PGD-CW attacks. For l2 attacks,
we use DeepFool [13] and C&W [15] attacks. We follow
Madry et al. [9] for attack parameters. For l∞ attacks,
we limit  to 0.3, 8/255 and 8/255 for MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and ImageNet-subset datasets respectively. Note that,
DeepFool and C&W attacks measure the robustness of the
model based on the l2 norm of the generated adversarial
perturbation.
Hyper-parameters: For SAT-R1, we set (λ, k) to (0.2, 1), (0.2,
1) and (0.05, 1) for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset
datasets respectively. For SAT-R2, we set λ to 5, 25 and
3 for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset datasets
respectively. For SAT-R3, we set (λ, τ ) to (1, 0.4), (1, 0.6) and
(1, 0.6) for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset datasets
respectively.
5.1 Performance against l∞ attacks
We train models on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-
subset datasets using the proposed single-step adversarial
training methods SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3. Further, we
also train models using NT, FGSM-AT, EAT, PGD-AT, and
TRADES methods. Models are trained for 20, 100 and 100
epochs on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-subset datasets
respectively. Table 3, 4 and 5 shows the performance of
these models against single-step and multi-step attacks in
7TABLE 3
MNIST: Recognition accuracy (%) of models trained on MNIST dataset using different training methods in white-box and black-box settings. Rows
represent training methods and columns represent attack methods. For all the attacks,  is set to 0.3. For PGD and PGD-CW attacks, step is set
to 0.01. The number of iterations/steps for multi-step attacks is set to 100. In black-box setting, model C and D are used for generating adversarial
samples.
White-box Black-box
Training Attacks C D
method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD PGD-CW FGSM MI-FGSM FGSM MI-FGSM
NT 99.24 11.50 0.24 0.00 0.00 22.28 9.57 51.31 44.65
FGSM-AT 99.29 85.86 17.02 3.95 5.32 91.81 88.20 90.12 88.92
EAT ens-A 99.37 79.63 5.39 0.34 0.41 89.33 83.44 92.14 90.78
EAT ens-B 99.31 84.12 2.36 0.06 0.08 86.79 77.79 91.62 88.57
EAT ens-C 99.43 80.08 2.87 0.05 0.11 85.82 76.44 92.21 89.52
PGD-AT 98.41 95.56 92.53 91.18 91.34 95.74 95.52 95.68 95.51
TRADES 98.70 96.25 94.96 93.60 93.69 96.43 95.93 96.32 96.05
SAT-R1 98.15 93.42 91.45 88.76 88.63 93.99 93.81 94.04 94.23
±0.05 ±0.07 ±0.26 ±0.26 ±0.27 ±0.09 ±0.07 ±0.06 ±0.07
SAT-R2 98.23 94.36 92.17 90.03 89.73 94.64 94.50 94.72 94.91
±0.12 ±0.09 ±0.40 ±0.32 ±0.29 ±0.06 ±0.04 ±0.04 ±0.05
SAT-R3 98.79 94.44 88.01 82.88 83.50 94.52 94.48 95.03 95.11
±0.24 ±0.36 ±0.39 ±0.60 ±0.43 ±0.25 ±0.30 ±0.22 ±0.24
TABLE 4
CIFAR-10: Recognition accuracy (%) of models trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using different training methods in white-box and black-box settings.
Rows represent training methods and columns represent attack methods. For all the attacks,  is set to 8/255. For PGD and PGD-CW attacks,
step is set to 2/255. The number of iterations/steps for multi-step attacks is set to 20. In black-box setting, VGG-11 and DenseNet-BC-100 are
used for generating adversarial samples.
White-box Black-box
Training Attacks VGG-11 DenseNet-BC-100
method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD PGD-CW FGSM MI-FGSM FGSM MI-FGSM
NT 94.75 28.16 0.02 0.00 0.00 48.46 31.61 39.58 28.50
FGSM-AT 94.04 98.54 0.04 0.01 0.02 78.70 76.35 86.90 86.42
EAT ens-A 92.92 59.56 19.05 7.11 8.02 80.99 80.35 87.52 87.72
EAT ens-B 92.75 63.40 6.26 0.85 0.88 83.72 83.60 89.01 89.26
EAT ens-C 93.11 59.74 15.36 3.73 3.96 84.21 84.35 88.95 89.35
PGD-AT 86.30 53.96 51.30 47.92 48.01 82.67 82.82 84.57 84.58
TRADES 86.92 56.34 53.00 49.92 50.13 82.83 82.97 84.77 84.87
SAT-R1 84.68 56.85 50.36 46.81 47.36 80.76 80.86 82.77 83.06
±1.40 ±0.08 ±0.13 ±0.66 ±0.22 ±1.70 ±1.67 ±1.67 ±1.71
SAT-R2 83.51 56.38 52.90 49.07 49.22 80.05 80.13 82.21 82.26
±0.14 ±0.07 ±0.49 ±1.14 ±0.66 ±0.26 ±0.26 ±0.48 ±0.20
SAT-R3 80.95 50.63 43.96 40.13 40.30 76.47 76.53 78.99 79.34
±0.75 ±2.24 ±2.08 ±2.82 ±2.40 ±1.49 ±1.47 ±1.91 ±1.94
white-box and black-box settings. For black-box attacks, a
normally trained model is used for generating adversarial
samples, and these generated adversarial samples are tested
on the target model. Typically, the model used for generat-
ing adversarial samples is referred to as a “source model”
or “substitute model”.
White-box setting: From tables 3, 4 and 5, it can be ob-
served that models trained using single-step adversarial
training methods (i.e., FGSM-AT, EAT) are susceptible to
multi-step attacks. Whereas models trained using PGD-AT,
TRADES, SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3 are robust against
both single-step and multi-step attacks. Note that, PGD-AT
and TRADES use iterative methods for the generation of ad-
versarial samples, due to which training time is significantly
high. Unlike PGD-AT and TRADES, the proposed methods
SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3 use non-iterative method for
crafting adversarial samples. Further, we obtain the plot of
test-set recognition accuracy of models trained using the
proposed regularizers for PGD attack with increasing steps.
Fig. 7 shows the obtained plot, it can observed that the
model’s accuracy saturates with increase in steps of PGD
attack. We obtain this plot to verify that the model’s perfor-
mance does not degrade significantly with the increase in
the number of iteration/steps of adversarial attack [37].
Black-box setting: The last four columns of table 3, 4 and 5
shows the performance of models in a black-box setting.
It can be observed that the performance of models trained
using PGD-AT, TRADES, SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3, in a
black-box setting is better than that in a white-box setting.
Note that, the model trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using
FGSM-AT is more susceptible to adversarial attack in a
black-box setting than in a white-box setting.
5.2 Performance against l2 attacks
DeepFool and C&W attacks belongs to a class of attacks
that generate adversarial perturbations without norm con-
8TABLE 5
ImageNet-subset: Recognition accuracy (%) of models trained on ImageNet-subset dataset using different training methods in white-box and
black-box settings. Rows represent training methods and columns represent attack methods. For all the attacks,  is set to 8/255. For PGD and
PGD-CW attacks, step is set to 2/255. The number of iterations/steps for multi-step attacks is set to 20. In black-box setting, VGG-13 and
ResNet-50 are used for generating adversarial samples.
White-box Black-box
Training Attacks VGG-13 ResNet-50
method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD PGD-CW FGSM MI-FGSM FGSM MI-FGSM
NT 78.74 4.68 0.04 0.00 0.00 47.08 26.64 71.28 67.30
FGSM-AT 77.10 40.51 12.46 2.84 4.08 72.48 72.90 75.78 74.66
EAT ens-A 76.04 39.21 8.00 2.92 3.20 69.64 69.74 73.78 72.92
EAT ens-B 76.44 40.83 9.00 3.56 3.64 71.20 71.46 74.72 73.70
EAT ens-C 76.66 41.72 8.92 3.32 3.26 70.70 71.20 74.66 73.70
PGD-AT 68.18 40.50 36.48 33.72 33.62 66.84 66.96 67.66 67.44
TRADES 67.32 42.10 36.80 34.34 34.53 65.93 66.51 67.30 67.10
SAT-R1 61.60 38.20 32.67 30.52 29.37 60.42 60.47 60.89 60.84
±0.36 ±0.17 ±0.14 ±0.34 ±0.70 ±0.40 ±0.34 ±0.37 ±0.45
SAT-R2 61.56 37.79 32.83 30.35 28.89 60.53 60.53 61.09 60.93
±1.61 ±0.77 ±0.51 ±0.67 ±0.97 ±1.47 ±1.51 ±1.62 ±1.57
SAT-R3 67.87 38.73 30.51 27.67 28.13 65.86 67.09 67.37 66.44
±0.75 ±1.60 ±1.32 ±1.43 ±1.49 ±1.35 ±1.78 ±1.30 ±1.15
straints. These attacks aim to generate adversarial pertur-
bations with a minimum l2 norm, that is just sufficient to
fool the classifier. The average l2 norm of the generated
perturbations indicates the robustness of the model. For an
undefended classifier, perturbations with a small l2 norm
is sufficient to fool the classifier. Whereas, for a robust
classifier, perturbations with relatively large l2 norm, are
required to fool the classifier. Table 6 shows the performance
of models against DeepFool and C&W attacks. Fooling Rate
(FR) represents the percentage of test-set samples that are
misclassified. It can be observed that for models trained
using PGD-AT, SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3, the average
l2 norm of the generated perturbations is relatively high.
5.3 Ablation study
We perform ablation study to show the significance of
the proposed regularizers. For the ablation study, we train
LeNet+ on MNIST dataset.
5.3.1 Ablation study on SAT-R1
Ablation-R1-1: SAT-R1 with λ=0. We train LeNet+ on
MNIST dataset using SAT-R1 with λ=0, and cross-entropy
loss imposed on both IFGSM and FGSM samples. We per-
form this experiment to show that the gain in the robustness
of the model is due to the proposed regularizer, and not due
to the inclusion of one IFGSM sample. Table 7 shows the
performance of the model trained using this method, and it
can be observed that the model is not robust to multi-step
attacks.
Ablation-R1-2: SAT-R1 with mini-batch containing k IFGSM
and m (mini-batch size) FGSM samples. We train LeNet+
using SAT-R1 with different values of k, to show that it is
sufficient to impose the proposed regularizer on a single
pair of FGSM and IFGSM sample in a mini-batch. Column-1
of Fig. 6 shows the plot of accuracy of the model on the PGD
validation set, trained using SAT-R1 with different values of
k. It can be observed that k=1 is sufficient to learn robust
models using SAT-R1.
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Fig. 6. Column-1: plot of accuracy of the model trained using SAT-R1
with different values of k. Column-2: plot of accuracy of the model
trained using Ablation-R1-3 (without regularizer) with different values of
k (expressed in term of percentage (%) of mini-batch size)
Ablation-R1-3: Adversarial training with mini-batches con-
taining k IFGSM and m FGSM samples without the pro-
posed regularizer. In this experiment, cross-entropy loss is
imposed on FGSM and IFGSM adversarial samples. We
train LeNet+ on MNIST dataset and during training, we
generate k (expressed in terms of original mini-batch sizem)
IFGSM and m FGSM samples. We perform this experiment
to show that without the proposed regularizer, at least 40%
of the samples should be generated using IFGSM method,
so as to learn robust models. Column-2 of Fig. 6 shows the
plot of accuracy of the model on the PGD validation set,
for different values of k. It can be observed that for k= 40%,
there is a significant improvement in the model’s robustness.
This implies that at least 40% of the samples should be
generated using the IFGSM method so as to learn robust
models without the proposed regularizer.
5.3.2 Ablation study on SAT-R2
Ablation-R2-1: SAT-R2 with λ=0. We train LeNet+ on
MNIST dataset using SAT-R2 with λ=0, and cross-entropy
loss is imposed on both FGSM and RFGSM samples. We
perform this experiment to show that the gain in the ro-
bustness of models trained using SAT-R2 is not due to the
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Performance of models trained using different training methods against DeepFool and CW attacks. These attack methods measure the robustness
of the model based on the average l2 norm of the generated perturbations, higher the better. FR defines the percentage of test set samples that
has been misclassified. Note that, models trained using PGD-AT, SAT-R1, SAT-R2 and SAT-R3, requires perturbations with relatively large l2 norm
to fool the classifier.
Method
MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet-subset
DeepFool CW DeepFool CW DeepFool CW
FR Mean l2 FR Mean l2 FR Mean l2 FR Mean l2 FR Mean l2 FR Mean l2
NT 99 1.83 100 1.68 96 0.20 100 0.12 94 0.39 100 0.32
FGSM-AT 99 2.81 100 1.96 96 0.25 100 0.10 92 0.70 100 0.23
EAT ens-A 99 2.69 100 1.88 95 0.69 100 0.61 91 1.23 100 0.89
EAT ens-B 99 2.68 100 1.86 95 0.63 100 0.70 91 1.34 100 1.03
EAT ens-C 100 2.60 100 1.84 95 0.77 100 0.70 92 1.37 100 1.09
PGD-AT 86 4.62 100 3.69 92 1.22 100 0.88 90 2.04 100 1.94
SAT-R1 89 4.51 100 3.34 92 1.11 100 0.84 91 1.61 100 1.74
SAT-R2 89 5.28 94 3.55 90 1.58 100 1.01 89 1.52 98 1.36
SAT-R3 95 3.01 100 2.13 90 0.98 100 0.87 89 1.95 100 1.64
TABLE 7
Ablation study: Recognition accuracy (%) of models trained on
MNIST dataset, for adversarial attacks in white-box setting. Please
refer to section 5.3 for details on training methods.
White-box
Training Adversarial attacks
Method Clean FGSM PGD PGD
steps=40 steps=100
Ablation-R1-1 97.71 91.35 16.48 0.97
SAT-R1 98.15 93.42 90.26 88.76
±0.05 ±0.07 ±0.16 ±0.26
Ablation-R2-1 95.39 61.60 34.15 33.41
Ablation-R2-2 93.92 57.06 29.31 28.76
SAT-R2 98.23 94.36 91.22 90.03
±0.12 ±0.09 ±0.37 ±0.32
Ablation-R3-1 97.62 92.52 1.89 0.78
Ablation-R3-2 97.56 72.35 1.53 0.63
SAT-R3 98.79 94.44 86.48 82.88
±0.24 ±0.36 ±0.42 ±0.60
inclusion of RFGSM samples.
Ablation-R2-2: Adversarial training with RFGSM samples.
We train LeNet+ on MNIST dataset using the adversarial
training method, and during training, adversarial samples
are generated using RFGSM. We perform this experiment to
show that adversarial training with RFGSM samples does
not improve the model’s robustness significantly.
5.3.3 Ablation study on SAT-R3
Ablation-R3-1: SAT-R3 with λ=0. We train LeNet+ on
MNIST dataset using SAR-R3 with λ=0. We perform this
experiment to show that adversarial training with only
FGSM samples does not improve the model’s robustness.
Ablation-R3-2: SAT-R3 with λ=0 and cross-entropy is im-
posed on FGSM samples with the perturbation size of Low
and High. We train LeNet+ on MNIST dataset using SAT-
R3 with λ=0, and cross-entropy imposed on FGSM samples
with the perturbation size of Low and High. We perform
this experiment to show that adversarial training with mini-
batches containing FGSM samples with the perturbation
size of Low and High, does not improve the model’s
robustness.
Table 7 shows the performance of models trained using
the above training methods, and it can be observed that
there is no significant improvement in the model’s robust-
ness against multi-step attacks.
5.4 Sanity tests
We perform sanity test described in Carlini et al. [31] to
verify the robustness of models trained using the proposed
method, and to rule out obfuscated gradients. Athalye et
al. [30] showed that certain defense methods unintentionally
or intentionally cause models to exhibit obfuscated gradi-
ents. Further, a method to break such defense methods was
proposed. This implies that models exhibiting obfuscated or
masked gradients are not robust. We perform the following
sanity tests to verify the robustness of models trained using
the proposed regularizers:
(i) Verify multi-step attacks perform better than single-
step attacks: For robust models, iterative attacks should be
stronger than non-iterative attacks in a white-box setting.
Table 3, 4 and 5, shows the performance of models against
single-step and multi-step attacks, and it can be observed
that iterative attacks (IFGSM and PGD) are stronger than
non-iterative attack (FGSM) for models trained using SAT-
R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3 methods.
(ii) Verify white-box attacks perform better than black-
box attacks: For any model, white-box attacks should be
stronger than black-box attacks. In black-box setting, partial
or no knowledge of the deployed model is available to the
attacker, and hence black-box attacks should be weaker than
white-box attacks. From table 3, 4 and 5, it can be observed
that white-box attacks are stronger than black-box attacks on
models trained using SAT-R1, SAT-R2, and SAT-R3 methods.
(iii) Verify for large perturbation size, model’s accuracy
reach levels of random guessing: Typically, the model’s
performance degrades drastically for attacks with a large
perturbation size (). We obtain the plot of recognition accu-
racy (%) of the model on PGD test set for different values
of attack perturbation size. Fig. 8 shows the plot obtained
for models trained using the proposed regularizers, it can
be observed that the recognition accuracy (%) of the model
is zero for PGD attack with large perturbation size.
(iv) Verify increase in the perturbation size strictly in-
creases attack success rate: From Fig. 8, it can be observed
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Fig. 7. Plot of recognition accuracy (%) versus steps/iteration of PGD
attack with fixed perturbation size (), obtained for models trained using
SAT-R1, SAT-R2 and SAT-R3. We set  to 0.3, 8/255 and 8/255 for
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-subset datasets respectively. Note
that, x-axis is in logarithmic scale. Observe the saturation of model’s
accuracy for PGD attack with large steps/iteration.
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Fig. 8. Plot of the recognition accuracy (%) of the model versus per-
turbation size () of PGD attack, obtained for models trained using the
proposed regularizers. Note that, accuracy of the model is zero for larger
perturbation size.
that the PGD attack success rate (success rate = 100 -
accuracy) increases with the increase in the distortion bound
i.e., perturbation size of PGD attack.
5.5 Loss trend
In this subsection, we obtain the plot of average loss on
the test set versus perturbation size of FGSM and PGD
attacks. Fig. 9 shows the plots obtained for models trained
using the proposed regularizers. It can be observed that
the average loss increases monotonically with the increase
in perturbation size of FGSM and PGD attacks. Further, it
can be observed that the difference between the loss on
FGSM and PGD samples is relatively small, even for higher
perturbation size (). Whereas, this difference would be
large for models exhibiting masked gradients.
5.6 Loss surface
In this subsection, we obtain the loss surface plots for mod-
els trained using the proposed regularizers. Fig. 9 shows
the obtained plots. It can be observed that there is no
sharp curvature near the decision points. Whereas, sharp
curvature near data points can be observed for models
exhibiting masked gradients (see column-2 plot of Fig. 3).
5.7 Complexity
In this subsection, we discuss the complexity of differ-
ent adversarial training methods. The adversarial sample
generation is the major bottleneck for adversarial training
methods. Typically, adversarial sample generation involves
TABLE 8
Complexity of adversarial training methods. FBP is equal to the
number of iterations/steps used for generating adversarial samples,
and this is dataset dependent. * For SAT-1, one sample in the
mini-batch is generated using IFGSM, and the corresponding FBP
value is mentioned inside the parenthesis.
Training FBP Pre-trained
method MNSIT CIFAR-10 ImagNet-Subset models
FGSM-AT 1 1 1 No
EAT 1 1 1 Yes
PGD-AT 40 7 7 No
TRADES 40 7 7 No
SAT-R1* 1 (40) 1 (7) 1 (7) No
SAT-R2 1 1 1 No
SAT-R3 1 1 1 No
TABLE 9
Boosting performance of SAT-R3: Recognition accuracy (%) of
LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset using the proposed regularizers in
sequential manner. SAT-R1 + SAT-R3: Model is pre-trained using
SAT-R1 for the first 5 epochs, and is trained using SAT-R3 for the next
15 epochs. SAT-R3 + SAT-R2: Model is trained using SAT-R3 for 15
epochs, and is fine-tuned using SAT-R2 for 5 epochs.
White-box
Training Adversarial attacks
Method Clean FGSM PGD PGD
steps=40 steps=100
SAT-R3 98.79 94.44 86.48 82.88
(20 epochs) ±0.24 ±0.36 ±0.42 ±0.60
Sequential training
SAT-R1 + SAT-R3 98.80 94.42 89.84 87.52
(5+15 epochs) ±0.09 ±0.16 ±0.70 ±1.21
SAT-R3 + SAT-R2 98.10 93.83 89.08 87.44
(15+5 epochs) ±0.25 ±0.62 ±0.52 ±0.46
computation of gradient of the loss with respect to the input
image. This requires one or more forward and backward
propagation through the network. We define a metric FBP ,
which corresponds to one Forward and Backward propaga-
tion through the network. Further, we use FBP to express
the complexity of the adversarial sample generation process.
Table 8 summaries the complexity involved in generating
adversarial samples during different adversarial training
methods. For FGSM-AT, which uses single-step method for
generating adversaries, requires only one forward and back-
ward propagation through the network to generate adver-
saries. For EAT, a fixed set of pre-trained source models are
required along with the model being trained for generating
FGSM adversarial samples. Therefore, additional training of
source models is involved. PGD-AT and TRADES methods,
which use iterative methods for generating adversaries, re-
quire multiple forward and backward propagation through
the network, and this causes a significant increase in the
training time. The proposed training methods use single-
step methods for generating adversaries, and this requires
only one forward and backward propagation through the
network, except for SAT-R1 where one sample in the mini-
batch is generated using an iterative method. Among the
proposed methods, complexity of SAT-R1>SAT-R2>SAT-
R3. SAT-R1 requires one IFGSM and ‘m’ FGSM samples. The
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Fig. 9. Plot of the average loss on the test set versus perturbation
size () of FGSM and PGD attacks, obtained for models trained using
the proposed regularizers. Columns represent the training method and
rows represent the dataset. Row-1: MNIST, row-2: CIFAR-10, and row-3:
ImageNet-subset. Column-1: SAT-R1, column-2: SAT-R2, and column-3:
SAT-R3.
generation of one adversarial sample using iterative method
is the bottleneck for SAT-R1. SAT-R2 requires generation
of ‘m’ FGSM and ‘m’ R-FGSM samples. Whereas, SAT-R3
requires ‘m’ FGSM samples with perturbation size of Low
and ‘m’ FGSM samples with perturbation size of High.
We use computational trick to reduce the time required
for generating these adversarial samples i.e., sign of the
gradient of loss required for generating adversarial samples
with perturbation size of High and Low is same. Therefore
computational complexity of SAT-R3 is lesser than SAT-R2.
5.8 Comparison of SAT-R1, SAT-R2 and SAT-R3
In terms of computational complexity, SAT-R1>SAT-
R2>SAT-R3. The performance of models trained using SAT-
R1 and SAT-R2 are similar. Whereas the performance of
models trained using SAT-R3 is relatively less superior than
compared to models trained using SAT-R1 and SAT-R2.
Among the proposed regularizers, SAT-R1 and SAT-R2 are
suitable when performance is of importance, and SAT-R3 is
suitable for cases where training time is the bottleneck e.g.,
training on large datasets.
Further, we demonstrate that it is possible to boost the
performance of models trained using SAT-R3, by either
pre-training or fine-tuning these models using SAT-R1 or
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Fig. 10. Loss surface plots obtained for models trained using the pro-
posed regularizers. Note that, no sharp curvature can be observed
on the loss surface. Columns represent the training method and rows
represent the dataset. Row-1: MNIST, row-2: CIFAR-10, and row-3:
ImageNet-subset. Column-1: SAT-R1, column-2: SAT-R2, and column-
3: SAT-R3.
SAT-R2 for few epochs. Table 9 shows the performance of
LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset using this approach. It
can be observed that there is an improvement in the model’s
robustness against multi-step attacks (PGD-40 and PGD-
100) when compared to the model trained using SAT-R3
only.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Adversarial training, a straightforward solution to defend
model against adversarial attacks, shows promising results.
However, models trained using the existing single-step ad-
versarial training converge to degenerative minima where
the model appears to be (pseudo) robust. Though multi-
step adversarial training methods such as PGD adversarial
training and TRADES methods help to learn adversarially
robust models, they are computationally expensive.
In this work, we have proposed three different types of
regularizers for single-step adversarial training. The pro-
posed regularizers harness the salient properties of robust
models to mitigate gradient masking effect, and help to
learn robust models using single-step methods in a compu-
tationally efficient manner. Unlike models trained using the
existing single-step adversarial training methods, models
trained using the proposed methods are robust against both
single-step and multi-step attacks.
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